Artsakh – the rock of temptation

Valery Egozaryan, Political scientist, PhD in Political Science

Another paroxysm of the Karabakh conflict has continued since September. Azerbaijan and Armenia exchange mutual accusations on the same regular basis as with gunfire shots. Sorting out these statements, looking into mutual blaming and finding out pseudo-historical details is a thankless and senseless business, worthy of “major political figures” and “court” experts. It is necessary to look for a way out of the situation in which people are dying, in which these people have lived for decades in fear, in uncertainty, without any prospects for themselves and their children.

Only political decisions of forces capable of this, embodied in concrete actions of the parties to the conflict, freeze it or kill people, destroy states or find a solution. For this, it is necessary to clearly imagine the real participants of Karabakh events and their interests.

Many influential actors are hidden behind the scenes of a relatively small theater of 30-year-long hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. The generally accepted name “Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict” reflects rather not the list of the participating states, but the national content of this conflict. Azerbaijan’s participation in it is understandable – the events take place within its territory, and it would like to occupy Artsakh as well as get rid of the Armenian populace in any way. Of course, the conflict with the participation of Armenians, their death and suffering oblige Armenia to be a party to the conflict. But in what capacity? From a formal point of view, Armenia is on the sidelines. According to the official position of Yerevan, there are no Armenian servicemen in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), the republic remains unrecognized even by Yerevan, and the Armenian Defense Ministry in its reports emphatically calls the conflict “Artsakh-Azerbaijani”. The participation of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in all negotiations is possibly dictated by the position of Baku. The latter does not want to discuss anything with the representatives of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh as well as strives to gain political weight. However, such a state of affairs should not prevent the elected head of the NKR Arayik Harutyunyan from being more public outside Artsakh, since we are talking about striving for independence.

It is obvious that Yerevan’s interest lies in the preservation of the NKR, the salvation and protection of the Armenians historically living in Nagorno-Karabakh, and its international recognition. Any other position of official Yerevan can lead to the fact that the regime will be overthrown by the society instantly. In its turn, Baku cannot afford to recognize the NKR, otherwise the result will be similar. In addition, the change in Baku’s position is not at all in the interests of its most important partner, Turkey.

It is already clear to the entire international community that Ankara is an active part to Karabakh’s conflict and, seemingly, the main stakeholder in this protracted war. We assume that its strategic interest lies in further full integration with Azerbaijan and obtaining direct access to the Caspian Sea, to Central Asian states and the Turkic-speaking regions of Russia.

Turkey has long been drifting from Kemalism towards the new Ottoman ideology and has never forgotten the political idea of ​​forming the “Great Turan” – an alliance of Turkic-speaking peoples under its patronage. This drift over the past few years has led Turkey to a certain crisis in relations with the European Union and the United States, which seems to have been deliberately manipulated into discontent by Turkey. Russia, Iran, China, Georgia, the countries of Central Asia, France, Greece, Cyprus – this is not a complete list of states that are closely watching the actions of Turkey and are interested in a particular solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Turkey has long and clearly claimed to be a leader in the Islamic world. Its active policy, including the military one, in Azerbaijan, Syria, Libya, Greece, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo quite clearly outlines the geography of the desired Great Turan – from the Southeast Europe to China, including North Africa and the Middle East.

In 2009, Ahmet Davutoglu, when he was Turkish Foreign Minister, said: “We are called neo-Ottomans. Yes, we are neo-Ottomans, we are forced to deal with neighboring countries and even go to Africa.” ¹ Already then he conveyed “hello” to France, saying that he had given instructions according to which “no matter which African country Sarkozy goes to, when he looks up he will see the Turkish embassy and its flag.” President Erdogan in October 2013, during his official visit to Kosovo, publicly asked not to forget that “Turkey is Kosovo. Kosovo is Turkey. “

Ankara’s unequivocal threats to the EU, disagreements with NATO members, its extremely unpleasant for China position on the issue of Uyghur rights and competition in Central Asia, the resulting tension with Washington seemed to some in Moscow the tempting cards in a political game. Skilled Turkish maneuvers gave Russia a reason to believe that the risk of Turkish expansion is minimal for it. But it turned out to be a game not of cards, but of chess again.

After the Russian SU-24 was shot down in 2015 and the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Turkey a year later, Ankara skillfully imitated a turn towards Russia, and then began to decisively penetrate into its spheres of interest. At the same time, it was tied to a number of economic and military-political issues: the construction of the now defunct Turkish Stream gas pipeline, the demonstrative purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems, some of which were later transferred to the United States for study, the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, etc. The open clash of interests between Russia and Turkey in Libya, Syria, in the situation around Cyprus, and the categorical non-recognition of Crimea as Russian, probably did nothing to help the Russian Foreign Ministry prepare a new strategy in the Turkish direction. In October 2019, at a meeting of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States, where Turkey plays a leading role, Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed to develop a program “Turkic Vision 2040”. This program is also supported by the current President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Zhomrat Tokayev. Excellent prospects for the implementation of the Great Turan strategy. However, one of the stumbling blocks and rock of temptation on this “great Turkish path” is the Artsakh ridge.

Ankara’s current successes further stimulate its foreign political activities. Appetite comes with eating. A demonstrative change in the status of Hagia Sophia, public blackmail of Brussels by hundreds of thousands of migrants, insults against President of France Emmanuel Macron and a boycott of French goods, open frustration on almost any occasion that, in Ankara’s opinion, affects its interests, remain unpunished. The ineffectiveness of the set of political and economic instruments used by international institutions and leading states does not give Turkey a single reason why it would stop dreaming about its expansion and going beyond the framework of regional leadership.

In October 2019, at a meeting of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States, where Turkey plays a leading role, Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed to develop a program “Turkic Vision 2040”. This program is also supported by the current President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Zhomrat Tokayev. Excellent prospects for the implementation of the Great Turan’s strategy. However, one of the stumbling blocks and rock of temptation on this “great Turkish path” is the Artsakh ridge.

What could be the current directions of the development of the Karabakh conflict? Basically, there are four of them, excluding the option of seizing Azerbaijan itself by the NKR’s armed forces which, for obvious reasons, is not considered:

– Ceasefire followed by another freezing of the conflict;

– Ceasefire and implementation of the 2007 Madrid agreements by its parties, which provide for the return of territories around Nagorno-Karabakh under the control of Azerbaijan, granting Nagorno-Karabakh a temporary status guaranteeing its security and self-government, opening a corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a peacekeeping operation, the return of migrants and future determining of Nagorno-Karabakh’s final legal status based on legally binding expression of will of the populace living there, etc .;

– Ceasefire and implementation of the “Kazan Formula 2011”, according to which 5 out of 7 regions are returned to Azerbaijan with their subsequent demilitarization, the borders are guarded by Russian peacekeeping forces, the Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia ends, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is decided, according to this formula, in several years after the return of migrants;

– Continuation of hostilities and the establishment of Baku’s control over the entire NKR territory by destroying and displacing the remaining Armenian population to Armenia.

Few are satisfied with the new freezing of the conflict. Perhaps this is only Iran and China, since this option will not give anyone any preferences, will continue to link Turkey, Azerbaijan, and will give Beijing and Tehran the opportunity to continue implementing their policies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Of course, Russia could use this option to continue political manipulations and maintain its relevance, but the surrounding world and the situation inside the country have changed too much. New deeds and proofs of Russian viability are needed. Therefore, Russia will insist on the implementation of the “Kazan Formula 2011”. However, apart from Russia, this option for resolving the conflict and strengthening the role of Russia per se does not suit all other parties too much.

In any case, Moscow does not want the bloodshed to continue for several fundamental reasons. Firstly, Azerbaijan is a strategic partner for Russia. Secondly, Armenia is perhaps the last real Russian ally in the post-Soviet space. Thirdly, Armenia is a member of the CSTO and any armed conflict involving Yerevan is a disaster for Moscow, since Russia will either have to fulfill its obligations under the treaty and enter the war on Armenian side, seeking for extremely insufficient resources in current conditions and finally ruining relations with Baku, or refuse to fulfill its obligations.

Most of the interested parties are satisfied with the implementation of the 2007 Madrid agreements. But the problem is that the principles of these agreements in their current form are unacceptable for the main stakeholders of the NKR conflict – Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic itself. Turkey and Azerbaijan will be fully satisfied only with the final liquidation of Artsakh and its Armenian population. For them, there can be no autonomy and independence of the NKR. Such a solution to the problem is a collapse for the political leadership of these countries; it can put an end to the implementation of the project for the possible full integration of Azerbaijan and Turkey. The continuation of hostilities and the establishment of Baku’s control over the entire NKR territory means the political strengthening of Ankara and its further advance to Central Asia and to the Muslim regions of the Volga region of Russia.

In fact, official Yerevan is not satisfied with any option other than Baku’s complete refusal to fight for Artsakh, which is unrealistic. One gets the impression that Armenia does not trust either the Madrid or Kazan principles of the conflict settlement. True, on October 30, Pashinyan finally and definitely spoke out in favor of bringing in Russian peacekeepers, but Baku is not ready for this.

One could fantasize about the peaceful agreement of Armenia and Russia on the liquidation of the NKR as an independent administrative unit and the integration of Azerbaijan and Turkey, receiving in return significant political and economic bonuses and guarantees. But Baku will not be able to discuss such issues without the consent of Ankara, which is not going to bargain with Yerevan. Why, if you can take everything from a weak one by force. Russia is a different matter, however, Moscow should finally have learned the lessons of the value of Turkish promises. In addition, the surrender of Artsakh, and in this case the loss of full influence in Armenia, and the actual merger of Azerbaijan with Turkey, will mean for Russia the final loss of Transcaucasia. Therefore, Moscow cannot remain idle. Any solution to the Karabakh conflict without its decisive participation will mean a fiasco of the entire Russian foreign policy strategy.

In this situation, if you choose the lesser of two evils, strategically Russia can be saved only by a clearly expressed pro-Armenian position. The irony is that Armenia itself should more clearly define its position and strategy. Further work under the Madrid Agreement could help it in this. Of course, the Madrid principles need more detailed elaboration and clarification of all requirements, conditions and every step of the conflicting parties in order to avoid double interpretation and convince the parties of the need for a peaceful solution. And for Moscow it would probably be more useful to implement the version of the Madrid agreements in partnership with the rest of the OSCE Minsk Group.

Ankara is now in a state of political euphoria. Internal opposition is broken, the international community is demonstrating impotence. There may not be another chance to cut the Karabakh knot with a total solution to the Armenian issue. Ankara will go to the end in achieving its long-term goals. Turkey has put too much on the line. It is unlikely that anything will be able to restrain the exorbitant growth of Turkish ambitions other than coordinated political and economic pressure from all interested countries, which at the moment seems unlikely.

[1] Seven E. Sarkozy gittiği her yerde bizi görecek. URL: http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/ sarkozy-gittigi-heryerde-bizi-gorecek-225129

Valery Egozaryan

PhD in Political Sciences, Specialty: Political Institutes, Ethnopolitical Conflict Resolution Studies, National and Political Processes and Techniques.

As an expert in foreign policy problems, international relations, global energy policy, public administration and national conflicts I was engaged by Russian and foreign organizations in participating and implementation of a number of different programs, including Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, the Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India), the Institute of Politics at Harvard University (Boston, USA), International Institute for Strategic Studies (London, United Kingdom).

Author of more than 30 analytical works and about 40 articles for issues of the digital economy development, problems of economic policy, Russian – U.S. relations, Cooperation of CIS States, terrorism, information policy, religious and national relations. Author of “Military-political cooperation of Russia with CIS States as an integration factor” monography (2001), co-author of “World terrorist…” book (2004).