James
K. Wither
Abstract
The term hybrid warfare has been widely analyzed by scholars, policy makers and commentators since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. The topic has ceased to be a subject only studied by military strategists, but has entered the wider policy domain as a significant security challenge for the West. This article seeks to place the debate about hybrid warfare in a broader analytical and historical context and summarizes discussion to date on this and related strategic concepts. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine is a particular focus for discussion
Key Words
Warfare, Strategy, Russian
Federation, NATO, European Security
Introduction
Since the Russian Federation invaded
the Crimea in March 2014, analysis and commentary on the concept of hybrid
warfare has increased exponentially.[1]
An Internet search will identify hundreds of entries covering the phenomenon. Hybrid
warfare has become the most common term used to try and capture the complexity
of 21st century warfare, which involves a multiplicity of actors and
blurs the traditional distinctions between different types of armed conflict
and even between war and peace. Hybrid warfare has ceased to be a topic only
for military strategists as it has now entered the broader public domain and
become a major security concern for Western governments. Both NATO and the
European Union (EU) are working on strategies to strengthen defensive
capabilities and prevent hybrid attacks.
This article
seeks to clarify the different ways in which the term hybrid warfare and
related terms have been used by scholars and policy analysts and summarize discussion
on the topic to date. The paper will examine, in particular, the Russian approach
to hybrid warfare as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine and will briefly assess
the significance of these developments for Western security policy.
Defining
Hybrid Warfare
Not surprisingly, there
are many definitions of hybrid warfare. The concept has been defined in
different, if related, ways and these definitions have evolved in a relatively
short space of time. Defining hybrid warfare is not
just an academic exercise. The way the term is defined may determine how states
perceive and respond to hybrid threats and which government agencies are
involved in countering them.
One approach to hybrid warfare takes an
historical perspective. This defines the term simply as the concurrent use of
both conventional and irregular forces in the same military campaign. Military
historian, Peter R. Mansoor, for example, defines hybrid warfare as “…conflict
involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars
(guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and
nonstate actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose.”[2]
Viewed from this perspective, hybrid warfare is clearly nothing new. There are
numerous examples of hybrid techniques and approaches at the tactical,
operational and strategic levels stretching back at least as far as the
Peloponnesian War and the writings of the Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu in the
fifth century BC. Irregular fighters have proved to be the bane of numerous
conventional militaries. Formidable armies such as Napoleon’s Grand Armée and Hitler’s
Wehrmacht struggled to combat irregular fighters who understood and exploited the
local human and geographical terrain and targeted vulnerable logistic bases and
lines of communication. Over time, guerrilla operations had a significant and
lasting impact on the broader conventional military campaigns of which they
were part. Recent counter insurgency (COIN) campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
have once again highlighted the difficulty of defeating determined irregular
fighters without committing human rights abuses against the local population
and consequently undermining domestic and international public support for the
campaign.
During
the 2000s, the use of the term “hybrid” became a common way to describe
contemporary warfare, particularly because of the increasing sophistication and
lethality of violent non-state actors and the growing potential of cyberwarfare.
Although there was no agreement that this necessarily constituted a new form of
warfare,[3]
definitions of hybrid warfare emphasized the blending of conventional and
irregular approaches across the full spectrum of conflict. For example, writing
in 2007, Frank G. Hoffman, a leading analyst of the concept, defined hybrid
warfare as “Threats that incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare
including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations,
terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal
disorder, conducted by both sides and a variety of non-state actors”.[4]
During its war with Georgia in 2008, Russia, for example, made use of a
combination of regular armed forces, South Ossetian and Abkhazian militias and
Russian special operations forces (SOF) operating covertly as “local defense”
troops. The mixing of conventional and irregular methods of warfare arguably distinguished
such hybrid wars from their historical forms. In the past, conventional and
irregular operations had tended to take place concurrently, but separately, rather
than being integrated. In addition, operations by irregular fighters were
normally secondary to campaigns by conventional military forces.
Prior
to 2014, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 was the most frequently
used example of a war that fitted contemporary definitions of hybrid warfare. Hezbollah, which had been trained and
equipped by Iran, surprised Israel with its sophisticated combination of
guerrilla and conventional military tactics and employed weaponry and
communication systems normally associated with the armed forces of developed
states. At the strategic level, Hezbollah made effective use of the Internet
and other media for information and propaganda. Hezbollah’s information
management proved much more successful than Israel’s in influencing world
opinion from the start of the conflict. As the discussion above illustrates, a
hybrid combination or conventional and military methods of warfare has been
used throughout history. But what is apparent from Hezbollah’s example and
others, including the guerrilla fighters in Chechnya and more recently Islamic
State (IS), is that modern weapon systems have greatly increased the lethality
of non-state actors. Developments in information technology have also provided
these groups with an unprecedented ability to engage in information warfare and
compete effectively with states to shape public opinion. The US Quadrennial
Defense Review Report in 2010 acknowledged these changes when it defined hybrid
warfare in the following manner ”…today’s hybrid approaches may involve state
adversaries that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy
forces to coerce or intimidate, or non-state actors using operational concepts
and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with states.”[5]
Hybrid
Warfare Post 2014
As noted above, Russia’s actions in Ukraine
in 2014 intensified interest in the concept of hybrid warfare. For many Western
commentators “hybrid” appeared to be the best way to describe the variety and
blending of tools and methods employed by the Russia Federation during its annexation
of Crimea and support to separatist groups in eastern Ukraine. Russian
techniques included the traditional combination of conventional and irregular
combat operations, but also the support and sponsorship of political protests,
economic coercion, cyber operations and, in particular, an intense disinformation
campaign. In an interview in July 2014, former NATO Secretary General, Anders
Fogh Rasmussen, described Russian tactics as “hybrid warfare”, which he defined
as “a combination of military action, covert operations and an aggressive
program of disinformation.”[6]
The 2015 edition of the Military Balance provides
a very comprehensive definition of the latest manifestation of hybrid warfare,
highlighting the methods employed “…the use of military and non-military tools
in an integrated campaign, designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative
and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic
means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations;
covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic
pressure”.[7]
What distinguishes this definition
of hybrid warfare from those discussed earlier is the emphasis on non-military
methods of conflict and, in particular, information warfare. The employment of coercive information operations is the most
distinguishing feature of the recent descriptions of hybrid warfare and allows some
comparisons to be drawn between IS’s campaigns in the Middle East and the very
different war and theatre of operations in Ukraine. IS has effectively blended
conventional and guerrilla tactics and gross acts of terrorism, but it has also
exploited propaganda and information warfare to an unprecedented extent for a
non-state actor. Sophisticated social media campaigns have glorified its cause
and high quality visual propaganda has contributed to the group’s ability to recruit
thousands of foreign fighters to its ranks. Information warfare was
also central to Russia’s successful campaign in Crimea in 2014. At the tactical
level, electronic warfare (EW) and cyber-attacks neutralized the ability of the
Ukrainian authorities to respond, while broader media exploitation techniques blurred
the lines between truth and falsehood, creating an alternative reality for
those observers who accepted the Russian media’s view of events. Russia’s strategic
information campaign in Ukraine sought to exploit existing societal
vulnerabilities, weaken government and state institutions and undermine the
perceived legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. Like IS, Russia used information
operations to influence and shape public perception, a recognition that the latter
has become the strategic center of gravity in contemporary armed conflicts.
It is hardly surprising that Russian analysts have argued
that information and psychological warfare are the foundations for victory in what
they refer to as “new-generation war”.[8]
A recent NATO Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Center of Excellence (COE)
report on Russian information warfare in Ukraine drew similar conclusions
regarding the significance of “information superiority” to Russia’s success,[9]
while NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Philip
Breedlove, reflected the consternation felt by many Western officials when he described
the Russian campaign as “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we
have ever seen in the history of information warfare.”[10]
According to former Russian TV producer, Peter Pomerantsev, this “blitzkrieg”
goes much further than historical information warfare operations. He argues
that “The new Russia doesn’t just deal with the petty disinformation, forgeries
lies, leaks and cyber-sabotage usually associated with information warfare. It
reinvents reality”.[11]
Related Theories of
Contemporary Warfare
Arguably, the concept of
hybrid warfare adds little to the notion of asymmetrical warfare. This term,
popularized after the Cold War, sought to characterize the kinds of strategies
and tactics employed by state and non-state opponents of the US and its allies to
counter the West’s overwhelming technological advantages and
firepower. These asymmetrical methods could naturally shift into non-military
fields expanding the grey area between war and peace that Russia has exploited
in Ukraine. However, so called asymmetrical methods of warfare, essentially
pitting one’s strengths against another’s weaknesses, have always been a
feature of successful military strategies. Many of the elements identified
as hybrid warfare also appear in discussion of so-called “Fourth-Generation
Warfare”, a contested theory originating in 1990s.[12]
A key concept in fourth-generation warfare is the exploitation of emerging
information technology, which allows non-state military actors to erode the will
of states to fight by targeting decision makers and the public through the
globalized, networked media and the Internet. Thus widening a “war” to include
cultural, social, legal, psychological and moral dimensions where military
power is less relevant.
Recent definitions of
hybrid warfare are also similar to the Chinese theory of unrestricted warfare. This
concept was discussed at length in the book “Unrestricted Warfare”, which was
published in 1999 by two colonels from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).[13]
It proposed methods of warfare to
enable countries like China to confront an opponent with superior military
technology such as the US. Similar to the concept of hybrid warfare, unrestricted
warfare involves the use of a multitude of means, both military and
non-military, to strike back at an enemy during a conflict. One of the authors
stated in an interview that “the first rule of unrestricted warfare is
that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden.”[14] Consequently,
unrestricted warfare methods include: computer hacking, subversion of the
banking system, markets and currency manipulation (financial war), terrorism, media
disinformation, and urban warfare. The authors, Liang and Xiangsui, argued that
developments in information technology and globalization had conclusively
changed the conduct of war which had consequently moved beyond the military
realm to a “new concept of weapons”, such as the use of computer viruses during
combat operations.[15] These
“new” techniques of warfare were referred to curiously as “kinder weapons”, but
the aim of their use remained Clausewitzian, that is to compel an opponent to
bend to China’s will. As a quotation from “Unrestricted Warfare” explained “… a
kinder war in which bloodshed may be avoided is still war. It may alter the
cruel process of war, but there is no way to change the essence of war, which
is one of compulsion, and therefore it cannot alter its cruel outcome, either.”[16] The
extent to which unrestricted warfare has become official Chinese doctrine is
not clear. However, recent reports suggest that the techniques of unrestricted
warfare may be evident in China’s “three warfares” approach to its territorial
claims in the East and South China seas.[17]
Are Non-Military Hybrid
Methods Really Warfare?
Hybrid warfare tends to be used to describe all wars that
are not strictly conventional, that is waged between the legally constituted
armed forces of nation states. Arguably, therefore, the term hybrid warfare is
too vague to be of practical use to analysts and policy makers. As Latvian
analyst, Jānis Bērziņš, notes “The word hybrid is catchy, since it may
represent a mix of anything”.[18]
The inclusion of a range of non-military means in a
definition of hybrid warfare runs the danger of describing normal inter-state
competition and conflict as war even in the absence of the threat or use of
violence. A realist concept of international politics already posits inter-state relations
as naturally competitive and conflictual. An environment in which sovereign
states, primarily concerned with their security, act in pursuit of their
national interests and struggle for power, cooperating and competing with other states as necessary
to best achieve their objectives. The usual economic, diplomatic and
informational measures used in inter-state competition are not normally
classified as warfare in the absence of the threat or actual use of force.
However, many of the statements emanating from Russia’s government and media suggest
that Russia perceives itself at “war” with Western democracy, culture and
values.[19]
This development suggests that, at least for the foreseeable future, Russia has
returned to a Soviet-era style battle of ideas with the West where, to reverse
Clausewitz, peace is essentially a continuation of war by other means. Rod
Thornton has suggested that the West must adjust to a situation where it is in
a “permanent” state of hybrid war with Russia.[20]
But “war” in this context is arguably the normal stuff of international
politics and it is misleading and potentially dangerous to describe Russia’s broader
aims and methods simply as a form of warfare. Analyst Ralph Thiele, for
example, includes Russian investments in key sectors of European economies and
Russian organized crime links with local criminal elements in the Russian model
of hybrid war.[21]
In this author’s opinion, only when non-military methods are coordinated or
integrated with the actual threat or use of armed force should policy makers
describe international political rivalry as a form of hybrid warfare. Naturally
a response to a real threat of hybrid warfare would require a comprehensive or
“whole of government” effort as non-conventional methods of warfare cannot be
addressed by military means alone. But it is probably a stretch to classify
efforts to target corrupt Russian officials as a form of “warfare” although it might
certainly be an element of soft power employed by Western states in their competition
with Putin’s Russia. Overall, it is worth remembering that even at the height
of the Cold War the Soviet Union and the US were able to temper their rivalry
to pursue mutually beneficial nuclear arms control agreements and limit proxy
wars.
New Generation Warfare: Russia’s
Hybrid Warfare
Like the authors of “Unrestricted Warfare”, Russian analysts make no
secret that their objective is to advocate approaches to warfare that will
counter perceived overweening and threatening US power. Many Russian commentators
and analysts claim that Russia has been under sustained and effective
information attack by the US since the 1980s. Events such as perestroika and
the “color revolutions” and multilateral organizations such as the IMF and
World Bank are all considered instruments of irregular warfare intended to destabilize
Russia.[22]
Viewed from a Russian perspective, the seizure of Crimea and operations in
eastern Ukraine are strategic defensive campaigns to counter US hybrid warfare
against its national interests and values.
Hybrid
warfare is a Western term, not a Russian one. When Russian analysts write on
the subject they use the terms “new generation warfare” or “non-linear war”. New
generation warfare was introduced to Western audiences through a paper
published by General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the Russian General Staff,
in February 2013. Consequently the Russian approach to hybrid war is sometimes referred to inaccurately
as the “Gerasimov Doctrine”. Gerasimov describes new generation warfare as:
“…the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other
non-military means…supplemented by civil disorder among the local population
and concealed armed forces”.[23]
Gerasimov recognizes that many of the methods that he
identifies were not traditionally part of what would be considered wartime
activities. However, he believes that they are typical of 21st Century
warfare and actually more significant for the achievement of strategic goals
than military means because they can reduce the fighting potential of an enemy by
creating social upheaval and promoting a climate of collapse without the overt
use of violence.[24]
Nevertheless, it is evident from Gerasimov’s paper that the armed forces have
an essential supplementary role in new generation warfare. This is particularly
the case with special operations forces (SOF) that can be used in the guise of
“peacekeeping and crisis regulation” to link up with opposition groups inside a
targeted state.[25]
In their discussion of new generation warfare, analysts Checkinov and Bogdanov also
envisage the employment of SOF in “…large scale reconnaissance and subversive
missions under the cover of the information operation”.[26]
The use of SOF under cover of information operations was
clearly evident in Ukraine in 2014. Covert spetsnaz
units (“the little green men”) were employed to seize government buildings and key
infrastructure targets and arm separatist militia, while the Russian government
spread doubt and confusion through repeated denials of Russian involvement.
Other techniques of hybrid or new generation warfare were used to demoralize and
intimidate opponents. These included exercises by Russian conventional forces
close to the Ukrainian border, cyber-attacks on Ukrainian government systems
and a wider diplomatic and media offensive to undermine the legitimacy of the
new government of Ukraine. The ultimate aim of this sort of “warfare” is to apply
psychological pressure to cause the collapse of the targeted state from within
so that the political objectives of the conflict can be achieved without
fighting, the acme of strategic skill according to Sun Tzu. Jānis
Bērziņš accurately sums up the Russian approach to modern warfare as follows
“…the main battlespace is in the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are
to be dominated by information and psychological warfare… The main objective is
to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary,
making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the
detriment of their government and country.”[27]
Many of the methods
that Russia has used in Ukraine date back to the Soviet era and the application
of maskirovka – military deception. This
was effectively applied by Soviet forces during World War II and in Cold War
proxy wars. For example, maskirovka was used on a grand style
in Operation Bagration in 1944 when
an entire German Army Group was destroyed. At the other end of the conflict
spectrum, maskirovka techniques were
employed in Eastern Europe after 1945 when Soviet interior ministry troops
(NKVD) used covert means to take over state institutions, undermine civil
society and crush all opposition to the imposition of communist rule.[28]
In the 21st Century, advances in information technology and
processing have greatly increased the scope of maskirovka, allowing the Russian government to employ multimedia
propaganda and misinformation on a massive scale. These have been used to build
support for the government’s foreign policy within Russia and to wage a wider
“information war” against Ukraine and the West. In the current NATO
context, Julian Lindley-French defines maskirovka
as “…war, that is short of war, a purposeful strategy of deception that
combines use of force with disinformation and destabilisation to create
ambiguity in the minds of Alliance leaders about how best to respond.”[29]
The concept of “reflexive control” (perception
management) is a key element of maskirovka.[30]It originated with the work of former
Soviet psychologist Vladimir Lefebvre who developed the theory while
researching ways to influence and control an enemy’s decision making processes.
The theory can be described as the use of specially prepared information that
inclines an opponent to voluntarily make a decision that has been predetermined
as desirable by the initiator of the information. Methods include blackmail, camouflage,
deception and disinformation, all intended to interfere with an opponent’s
decision- making cycle in a way favorable to Russian policy. The continued
post-Soviet interest in reflexive control techniques was demonstrated by the
launch of a new security studies journal entitled “Reflexive Processes and
Control” as recently as 2001.[31]
In practice, the execution of new generation warfare poses
significant challenges. A wide range of different parties, civil and military,
regular and irregular, as well as their activities, have to be coordinated,
integrated and controlled to achieve the overall military and political
objectives. Unified political control is especially difficult as irregular and
state actors often have differing political interests. Even for an
authoritarian state such as Russia, control and coordination proved difficult
during operations in Ukraine, which appear to have been less well orchestrated
than many Western commentators believed at the time.[32]
For example, an analysis by the Wilson Center concluded that Russian actions in Ukraine were not
part of a well-coordinated master strategy but rather reflected “…the unplanned
succession of different tools to fit different – often unexpected – operational
realities”.[33]
Russian Hybrid Warfare as
a Threat to NATO
Much concern has been expressed about NATO’s
vulnerability to Russian hybrid warfare techniques. Naturally the security of
the Baltic States, with their significant Russian speaking minorities, is of
particular concern. It has been longstanding Russian policy to weaken, divide
and ultimately neutralize NATO. The Baltic States provide Putin with the
potential leverage to achieve this aim. Just as Russian meddling in Ukraine
started long before the annexation of Crimea, political and social pressure has
been ratcheted up in the Baltic States.[34]
Some European intelligence agencies have also expressed fears about Bulgaria,
where the entire political system is believed to be compromised by criminal
organizations linked to the Russian state by Russian intelligence agencies.[35]
NATO strategy to combat Russian hybrid warfare needs to combine diplomatic,
military, informational, economic and law-enforcement efforts. But such a
“comprehensive” approach needs to be properly integrated, rather than simply involving
civilian agencies in support of military forces or replacing armed force with
civilian measures due to a reluctance to deploy the former.
In a crisis over the Baltic States, Russia would likely seek
to divide NATO members by staying below an obvious Article 5 threshold, at
least initially. As during the Ukraine crisis in 2014, disinformation,
intimidation and propaganda would be used to try to encourage the less robust
members of NATO to accept the Russian version of events, which would, of
course, conveniently reinforce their existing inclination to avoid a military
response. Disinformation would be used against NATO governments and wider
public opinion to keep the alliance politically and militarily off-balance.
Intimidation would likely highlight Russia’s apparent willingness to employ
nuclear weapons to de-escalate NATO “aggression”. Effective strategic
communication could counter Russian narratives, but it would need to be
responsive, coherent and consistent. Although the EU adopted a strategic
communication action plan in 2015, there is no evidence that EU planning
includes coordination with the NATO’S STRATCOM COE, which was founded in 2014.[36]
Such coordination would be vital to respond effectively to a Russian
disinformation and propaganda campaign. Unfortunately, authoritarian societies
have an advantage as they can more easily mobilize all of the resources of the
state for political purposes without the restrictions imposed by a decentralized
distribution of power and a democratic consensus-building process. In contrast,
liberal democracies have a distaste for propaganda and psychological warfare
and the NATO alliance would find it difficult to agree on the content and presentation
of a strategic communication campaign. As the STRATCOM COE acknowledges Russia has
a potential asymmetrical advantage over the West as the latter’s free media
cannot compete with centrally controlled and synchronized Russian information
warfare operations.[37]
However, NATO may not be as vulnerable to information
warfare as many believe. Propaganda can have a particularly strong effect when
a population, as in Russia, is denied alternative sources of information, but
elsewhere propaganda needs to be plausible enough to shape beliefs and emotions
and exploit general uncertainty, mistrust and paranoia. Russian government
pronouncements and media sources have become increasingly discredited in the
West, especially since their responses to the shooting down of Flight MH 17 over
Ukraine in July 2014. Increased control
of the national media and the Internet and harassment of dissenters made it
possible to shape Russian public opinion. But, despite the efforts of Russia
Today (RT) and a veritable army of Internet trolls to contradict and abuse news
outlets and social media that take anti-Russian positions, Russian information
operations have largely failed to influence non-Russian speaking audiences.[38]
Ukrainian government sources claim that there is now a very low level of public
confidence in any official Russian media[39]
and despite Russia’s intense information campaign, support for pro-Russian
separatists even amongst Russian-speaking Ukrainians was lower than anticipated.
This partly explained Russia’s need for a more overt military involvement in
the conflict in summer 2014.[40]
In a crisis, Russian tactics will likely involve covert
support to local pro-Russian activists. As in Ukraine, ambiguity and
deniability will make it difficult to confirm that an attack is under way. The
following quotation from Mark Galeotti starkly illustrates the potential
difficulties of responding to these methods, especially forcefully.
“The first little green man, after
all, might instead be a 15-year-old Russian-Estonian girl waving a
“Russian-speakers have rights, too”
placard in the border city of Narva. Shoot her? Of course not. The second might
be her older brother, throwing rocks at the police coming to arrest her. Shoot
him? Hopefully not, especially as you can guarantee that footage of the
incident would promptly be blasted across Russian TV channels.”[41]
Paramilitary police would probably be better equipped and
trained to handle such a situation than soldiers, which is another example of where
closer cooperation between the EU and NATO would undoubtedly be beneficial.
If a crisis escalated, Russia might be tempted to seize territory in
vulnerable frontline states by overt military means before the alliance can
mount an effective collective response.[42]
The nightmare scenario for NATO would be the occupation of part of a member
state even temporarily. Such action would force the alliance to invoke Article
5 of the Washington Treaty and risk a direct armed confrontation with a
nuclear-armed Russia or fail to respond to the aggression and risk the collapse
of NATO as a viable military alliance. Despite the misgivings of states such as
Germany, effective deterrence will require the permanent stationing of
significant multinational forces on the territory of states that might be at
risk in order to deny Russia the option of a military fait accompli. Although
NATO’s new 5,000 strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) should be able
to deploy rapidly it may still arrive too late to deter Russian adventurism.
The Russian approach to hybrid warfare does not exclude the direct use of
military force when necessary. In summer 2014, when Russia had exhausted its
use of non-military hybrid methods, military operations in Ukraine took on the
character of limited conventional war. Russian battalion tactical groups (BTG)
intervened directly in combat against the Ukrainian army. Fighting involved
clashes between armored forces, intense urban infantry battles, heavy artillery
barrages and, at least on the Russian side, the employment of “drones” for
surveillance and target acquisition, electronic warfare and air defense assets.[43]
NATO troops have already started to learn from the experiences of Ukrainian
soldiers about Russian tactics and technologies, in particular the use of
drones to direct artillery fire and Russian electronic jamming capabilities.[44]
However, such tactical improvements alone are unlikely to be enough to provide credible
conventional deterrence against armed attack.
Conclusion
Hybrid
warfare does not change the nature of war. Violence remains at the core of
hybrid warfare as it does any other form of war and its aim is the same as any
other act of war, namely, to exploit the threat or use of organized violence to
gain physical or psychological advantages over an opponent. But the plethora
of terminology: hybrid, asymmetrical, unconventional, non-linear, new
generation, 4th & 5th generation, grey wars etc.
reflects the difficulties that strategists and scholars continue to have to categorize
the complex armed conflicts of the 21st Century. The term hybrid is
currently the most popular, but is by no means the only term to describe these
wars. The fact that many armed conflicts blur the lines between war and peace
and involve the use of instruments that were not traditionally part of
warfighting further complicates the problem. It is undoubtedly a challenge for
national security establishments to address the wide range of threats
identified by the analysts and scholars of hybrid warfare. Cast the
definitional net too wide and a term like hybrid warfare becomes too
all-encompassing to be of any practical use to policy makers. Define warfare
too narrowly and policy makers may fail to appreciate the significance of many
non-traditional techniques of warfare that are being employed by an adversary as
a prelude or adjunct to the use of military force.
Regardless
of how the threat is labelled, strategists need to decide how best to address
the methods being employed by their adversaries, whether state or non-state
actors. Sometimes the most appropriate responses may involve the application of
specific political, informational, economic, diplomatic or, in the case of a
physical threat, military tools of statecraft. More complex threats require a
whole of government or comprehensive approach. Usually, the best strategies
involve the coordination and direction of all of the effective instruments of
state power, no matter how the threat is defined. Undoubtedly NATO needs to
enhance its military deterrent capability, but in the case of the West’s
adversarial relationship with Putin’s Russia, the temptation to describe this rivalry
as hybrid warfare may inflame an already challenging security situation and
blind governments to potentially productive traditional diplomatic policy
initiatives.
James K. Wither is Professor of National Security Studies and Director Fellowship
programs at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC)
in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He is a retired British Army Officer and
former researcher in 20th Century Warfare at the Imperial War Museum. He has
published widely on the subject of warfare and terrorism and taught or
presented terrorism related subjects at a wide variety of institutions, including
the FBI Academy, the UK Defence Academy, the NATO School, the Geneva Centre for
Security Policy and the Afghan Army Staff College. His publications include
book chapters, monographs and journal articles. The latter include papers for Small Wars and Insurgencies, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Global War Studies, European Security, Prism,
Connections and Parameters.
Professor Wither is co-editor of the book Combating Transnational Terrorism,
which was published in January 2016.
[1] Recent analyses include: Hoffman, Frank, “On
Not So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats”, War on the Rocks (blog), July 28, 2014, accessed December 8, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/,
Boot, Max, “Countering Hybrid Warfare”, in Max Boot, Alia Brahimi, Walter Kemp, Jennifer
Tobias & Thomas G. Weiss, Chapter One: The Changing Character of Conflict,
Armed Conflict Survey, Armed Conflict Survey 1915, Thiele, Ralph D, “Crisis in Ukraine – The
Emergence of Hybrid Warfare”, ISPSW
Strategy Series, May 2015, accessed December 8, 2015, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=190792,
Thornton, Rod, “The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare, RUSI Journal, 160, 4, (2015) 40 – 48, Freedman Lawrence, “Ukraine
and the Art of Limited War”, Survival, 56,
6 (2014), 7 – 38, Kofman, Michael and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer Look at
Russia’s Hybrid War”, Wilson Center, Kennan
Cable, No. 7, April 14, 2015, accessed December 8, 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no7-closer-look-russias-hybrid-war
[2] Mansoor, Peter R. “Hybrid War in History” in Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to
the Present, edited by Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor (Cambridge:
University Press, 2012), 2.
[3] GAO-10-136R, Hybrid Warfare,
September 10, 2010, accessed December 4, 2015. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1036R
[4] Hoffman, Frank G., Conflict
in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Arlington VA:
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[5] QDR Report 2010, Department of Defense, February 2019, 8. Accessed
December 4, 2015 http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf
[6] Landler, Mark and Michael R. Gordon, “NATO Chief Warns of Duplicity
by Putin on Ukraine”, The New York Times,
July 8, 2014. Accessed December 7, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/world/europe/nato-chief-warns-of-duplicity-by-putin-on-ukraine.html?_r=1
[7] “Complex Crises Call for Adaptable and Durable Capabilities”, The Military Balance, 115, 1 (2015)
5.
[8] For example see: Chekinov, S.G. and S.A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and
Content of New Generation War”, Voyenna
Mysl (Military Thought), 4, (2013), accessed December 9, 2015. http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/MT_FROM%20THE%20CURRENT%20ISSUE_No.4_2013.pdf
[9] NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (SRTATCOM COE), Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign
Against Ukraine, Report No. 3, 2015, 4, accessed December 15, 2015. http://issuu.com/natostratcomcoe/docs/ukraine_research_natostratcomcoe_02
[10] Vandiver, John, “SACEUR: Allies Must Prepare for Hybrid Warfare”, Stars and Stripes, September 4, 2015, accessed
December 7, 2015. http://www.stripes.com/news/saceur-allies-must-prepare-for-russia-hybrid-war-1.301464
[11] Pomerantsev, Peter, “How Russia is Revolutionizing Information
Warfare”, Defense One, September 9,
2014, 3, accessed December 10, 2015. http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/09/how-russia-revolutionizing-information-warfare/93635/
[12] Benbow, Tim, “Talking ‘Bout Our Generation? Assessing the Concept
of Fourth-Generation Warfare”, Comparative
Strategy, 27, 2 (2008): 148 – 163. Even more contested is the notion of
“Fifth Generation Warfare” see for example Reed, Donald J, “Beyond the War on
Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31, 8 (2008), 684 – 722.
[13] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted
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Publishing House, 1999), 2, accessed December 15,
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[14] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted
Warfare, 2.
[15] Liang and Xiangsui Unrestricted
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[16] Liang and Xiangsui Unrestricted
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[17] See for example: Garnaut, John, “US Unsettled by China’s Three
Warfares Strategy: Pentagon Report”, The
Sydney Morning Herald, April l1, 2014, accessed December 16, 2015 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/us-unsettled-by-chinas-three-warfares-strategy-pentagon-report-20140410-36g45.html
and Holmes, James R, “Exposing China’s Provocations”, The Diplomat, August 28, 2014, accessed December 16, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/exposing-chinas-provocations/
[18] Bērziņš, Jānis, “A New Generation of Warfare”, Per Concordiam, 6, 3, (2015) 24,
accessed December 9, 2015. http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordiam/pC_V6N3_en.pdf
[19] “Russia’s War on the West”, The
Economist, February 14, 2015, accessed December 17, 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter
[20] Thornton, “The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare”, 45.
[21] Thiele, “The Crisis in Ukraine – The Emergence of Hybrid Warfare”,
6.
[22]Bērziņš, “A New Generation of Warfare”, 23 and
Perry, Bret, “Non-Linear Warfare in the Ukraine: The
Critical Role of Information Operations and Special Operations”, Small Wars Journal, August 14, 2015,
accessed December 9, 2015. http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/bret-perry
[23] General Gerasimov’s article is available in English from “The
Gerasimov Doctrine and Russian Non-Linear War”,
In Moscow’s Shadows, posted by
Mark Galeotti on July 6, 2014, accessed December 11, 2015. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/
[24] “The Gerasimov Doctrine and Russian Non-Linear War”, 2 – 3.
[25] “The Gerasimov Doctrine and Russian Non-Linear War”, 3 – 4.
[26] Chekinov, S.G. and S.A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of New
Generation War”, 20
[27] Bērziņš, Jānis, “Russian New Generation Warfare
in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy”, National Defence Academy
of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, Policy Paper No. 2,
April 2014, accessed December 14, 2015 http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx
[28] For a detailed account of this process see: Applebaum, Anne, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe
1944-1956, (London: Allen Lane, 2012)
[29] Lindley-French, Julian, NATO:
Countering Strategic Maskirovka, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs
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[30] Thomas, Timothy L, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the
Military”, Journal of Slavic Military
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Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare”, Institute for the Study of War,
September 2015, accessed December 11, 2015. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin%27s%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdf
.
[31] Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military”, 237.
[32] Freedman “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War”, 11. Kofman and Rojansky,
“A Closer Look at Russia’s Hybrid War” 5.
[33] Kofman and Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s Hybrid War” 5.
[34] See for example Osborn, Andrew, “Putin a Threat to Baltic States,
Western Officials Say”, Reuters,
February 19, 2015, accessed December 18, 2015. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-russia-baltics-idUKKBN0LN0FT20150219
[35] Jones, Sam, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War”, Financial Times, August 28, 2014,
accessed December 10, 2015. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html
[36] Giegerich, Bastian, “Hybrid Attacks Demand Comprehensive Defence”, Ethics and Armed Forces, 2 (2015) 15,
accessed December 9, 2015. http://www.ethikundmilitaer.de/fileadmin/Journale/2015-12_English/Hybrid_Warfare-Enemies_at_a_Loss_2015-2.pdf
[37] NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (SRTATCOM COE), Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign
Against Ukraine, 3.
[38] Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War” 23 and Snegovaya,
“Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine”, 18 – 20.
[39] “Sociology of Information Warfare in Ukraine”, European Insight, October 11, 2015, accessed December 10, 2015. http://en.europeinsight.net/sociology-of-information-warfare-in-ukraine/
[40] Kofman and Rojansky. “A Closer Look at Russia’s Hybrid War”, 5.
[41] Galeotti, Mark, “Time to Think About Hybrid Defense”, War on the Rocks, July 2015, accessed
December 8, 2015. http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/time-to-think-about-hybrid-defense/
[42] See Colby, Elbridge and Jonathan Solomon, “Facing Russia:
Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe”, Survival, 57, 6 (2015) 23 – 24.
[43] Karber, Philip A, Lessons
Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War, The Potomac Foundation, July 6, 2015.
[44] Foreign Policy Situation
Report, December 10, 2015,.accessed December 14, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/10/situation-report-carter-gets-through-another-hill-appearance-new-book-by-former-intel-chief-nato-training-against-russian-tactics-india-comes-to-the-pentagon-house-wants-to-supply-kurds-new-nort/