Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling 

Henri LAZAR, politologue

Les métamorphoses qui se produisent aujourd’hui en Russie n’ont pas commencé hier et pas tout d’un coup. Elles ont mûri devant le monde entier au cours des 20 dernières années.

Certains ne comprenaient pas tandis que d’autres prétendaient ne pas comprendre vers quoi la Russie se précipitait, continuant à flirter, espérant que tout se passera, encourageant le régime de Poutine, tout en bénéficiant d’avantages économiques.

Seulement, l’attaque armée contre l’Ukraine, vient de nous mettre en évidence que cette image moderne de la Russie a finalement rejeté le masque post-soviétique démocratique.

Seule cette guerre a forcé le monde civilisé à reconnaître que la Russie a des valeurs complétement différentes qui déterminent sa politique tant étrangère qu’intérieure.

Poutine et son environnement a inscrit une nouvelle page dans le dictionnaire encyclopédique, celle du fascisme moderne.

Faire une analyse et donner une interprétation de cette transformation du fascisme qui a eu lieu au cours des 100 dernières années de Mussolini à Poutine, c’est un des défis pour les politologues et les analystes, lequel est nécessaire pour déterminer l’image de l’Etat du futur pour éviter les erreurs tragiques de la jonglerie entre les intérêts nationaux et la négligence de vraies valeurs, lors de la construction d’une société juste et sûre.

Nous n’allons pas maintenant, analyser et prouver que la guerre en Ukraine qui a été planifiée depuis 10 ans avec le premier essai de force en 2008 en Ossétie du Sud et l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 avec une incompréhensibilité négligente voire la coupable incurie des leaders mondiaux, ont conduit la Russie a un sentiment d’impunité totale et l’incapacité des Organisations internationales à résister à la pression de la puissance armée.

Les forces séparatistes depuis longtemps formées par F.S.B de la Russie dans le Donbass et qui ont commencé avec le soutien de l’armée russe ainsi que des services spéciaux, ont commencé le conflit armé en avril 2014 et qui ont pris ou saisi le pouvoir, ne sont pas non plus l’objet du présent article.

Le plus important, c’est d’essayer de comprendre comment le peuple qui a survécu à la seconde guerre mondiale, le peuple qui a vaincu le nazisme, qui a payé 28 millions de vies pour cette victoire est devenu un pilier du régime fasciste qui a annoncé cyniquement la lutte contre les nazis en Ukraine.

Il convient de noter que, pendant de nombreuses décennies, tant en Union Soviétique qu’en Russie moderne, on n’utilise pas le terme « la deuxième guerre mondiale »

Dans le système éducatif, dans les médias et dans la vie quotidienne, c’est le terme « la grande guerre nationale », qui a durée de 1941 à 1945.

Ni dans la société soviétique, ni dans la société russe, les deux années de guerre de 1939 à 1941 sont comme si elles n’avaient pas existé.

Comment expliquer cela ?

Très simplement, car le fait est que du mois d’août 1939 jusqu’au mois de juin 1941, l’URSS était un allié de l’Allemagne hitlérienne et conformément au pacte Molotov / Ribbentrop en cas de la réorganisation territoriale et politique de la Pologne de l’Est, la Lettonie, l’Estonie, la Finlande et la Bessarabie auraient dû être incluses dans la zone d’intérêt de l’Union Soviétique.

Le 1^er septembre 1939, l’Allemagne a attaqué la Pologne et le 17 septembre l’armée rouge est entrée sur le territoire polonais avec le prétexte déjà connu pour « protéger les vies et les biens » de la population ukrainienne et biélorusse de la Pologne.

A ce moment-là, le fascisme allemand était tout à fait acceptable pour le Kremlin en tant qu’allié.

Mais, qu’est-ce que c’est le Fascisme ?

Où est la ligne de partage entre la valeur qui aide à distinguer l’idéologie fasciste de l’idéologie nationale ?

L’idéologie du fascisme s’est développée comme une mosaïque de dilemmes sociaux et de fragments intellectuels de l’Ere de Fin du Siècle.

Le publiciste britannique Thomas Carlyle, le philosophe Frédéric Nietzsche, le sociologue Arthur de Gobineau, le juriste et sociologue Gaétan Mosca, le poète et critique Charles Maurras, le philosophe Georges Sorel, le journaliste Enrico Corradini fondateur du Futurisme, Philippe Tommaso, Marinetti sont quelques marches du long escalier qui a conduit l’ancien professeur d’école Benito Mussolini à la place de leader des fascistes italiens.

Les résultats de la première guerre mondiale ont conduit Mussolini à penser que le socialisme a échoué et que pour la renaissance de la nation italienne, il faut une personne dure et énergique. Mussolini était convaincu de la nécessité d’une ère de collectivisme qui relèguerait les intérêts de l’individu en arrière-plan. Dans sa compréhension, l’état devait tout absorber. Les principaux postulats de sa compréhension du fascisme ont été, un peu plus tard, exposés dans l’essai « la Doctrine du fascisme »

• L’Etat est totalement inclusif, en effet, en dehors de l’Etat fasciste, il n’y a pas de valeurs humaines et spirituelles.
• Le fascisme ne va pas avec le socialisme et le mouvement syndical. Tous les conflits sociaux sont résolus dans le cadre d’un système unique national corporatif
• Le fascisme est absolument opposé au libéralisme, c’est-à-dire à la liberté tant en politique qu’en économie
• L’Etat fasciste gère l’économie comme dans d’autres domaines de la vie à travers les entreprises, institutions sociales et éducatives de l’Etat.

Même les politiciens européens et américains l’admiraient, il était l’exemple d’un gestionnaire d’Etat efficace. Il menait un mode de vie sain, il était athlète, il volait en avion, nageait, conduisait, faisait du cheval. Il était un exemple de la Nation, un défenseur des valeurs familiales. Il finançait la culture et surtout le cinéma en le considérant comme un des Arts les plus importants et un instrument de propagande. Pour tout cela, au début, on lui a pardonné ses petits défauts comme le fait qu’il ait toujours admis dans ses activités politiques l’utilisation de méthodes de luttes légales et illégales.

Mussolini, Hitler, Franco ou Poutine ?

Vous pouvez donc attribuer ce paragraphe à l’un d’eux et aussi compléter celui -ci avec d’autres héros modernes.

Un Etat fort dont toutes les aspirations personnelles de ses citoyens y sont subordonnées, le contrôle des syndicats, l’interdiction du libéralisme et de la liberté d’expression, l’absence d’un système juridique indépendant, l’économie d’état, le paternalisme total et l’absence de la propriété privée, sont les caractéristiques que l’on peut retrouver à la fois dans l’Italie fasciste, l’Allemagne hitlérienne, l’Espagne franquiste, l’Union Soviétique, l’Iran, la Corée du Nord, le Venezuela ou la Russie de Poutine.

Toutes ces caractéristiques, seulement avec la polarité inversée sont des valeurs absolues et reconnues par le Monde civilisé et cultivé :

• Les intérêts de l’individu
• Les syndicats et les tribunaux indépendants
• Le libéralisme et la liberté d’expression
• Le rôle limité et responsable dans l’économie
• La propriété privée protégée

Au lieu d’une horrible grimace de paternalisme, nous avons la responsabilité sociale de l’Etat et des entreprises.

Est-il assez simple de nier ces valeurs pour devenir fasciste ?  Probablement pas.

Certainement pour donner une légitimité au régime, il est nécessaire d’imiter les élections démocratiques et parfois le paysage sous la forme d’une opposition politique,

L’élitisme, la particularité de la nation, son importance pour le reste du Monde et sa voie particulière sont très important pour la compréhension du fascisme.

Est également nécessaire l’élément du corporatisme, lorsque différents groupes sociaux soi-disant fusionnés dans l’unité patriotique dans la prospérité d’Etat, alors qu’il s’agit de la substitution de la notion d’Etat.

En règle générale, les images du dictateur et l’Etat sont unifiées.

Le leader et l’Etat dans l’esprit des masses, deviennent complétement identiques.

Cependant l’Histoire a montré qu’il n’y a pas de dirigeants immortels.

Les Etats fascistes cherchent généralement à atteindre l’autosuffisance économique en utilisant le protectionnisme et l’intervention de l’Etat dans l’économie.

Par exemple, dans la Russie moderne, on aime beaucoup le terme « substitution des importations » si, l’autosuffisance en raison du sous-développement technologique, ne peut pas être assurée, il est possible d’utiliser les ressources sans pareil tel que le gaz naturel pour construire une dépendance globale et le chantage. Rien de personnel, juste les affaires.

Cela n’est pas une recette complète pour le fascisme. Dans ce cocktail fou, nous avons besoin de l’ingrédient principal, le catalyseur de tous les processus : l’ennemi extérieur, dont la présence justifierait toute expansion.

Le fascisme, en principe, rejette l’affirmation selon laquelle la violence est négative et s’oblige à rééduquer les incompréhensibles. Les vérités de base entrent bien mieux si elles sont introduites en force. Car pour les discussions, il est nécessaire d’avoir du temps et de l’éducation qui manque voire qui devient dangereuse si elle est acquise par les masses populaires.

Et on suppose qu’il n’y a rien de terrible parce que tout est juste pour le bien de l’Etat. La violence politique et la guerre ne sont que les instruments efficaces du développement national.

Le fascisme met l’accent sur la reconnaissance de la nature virile de la violence et de la guerre, comme une nécessité. Une sorte de nécessité dure pour protéger les intérêts nationaux.

Un culte particulier du machisme étatique qui conduit rapidement et logiquement à ce que, parmi les voisins, on trouve des « sous-hommes » comme les Juifs pour l’Allemagne nazie, les Arméniens en Turquie et les Ukrainiens pour la Russie de Poutine.

En fin de compte, une fois que la plus grande partie de la société, même si elle est silencieuse, unie autour de son « Duce » dans son rejet de l’autre, il y a une transformation du pays en un état fasciste.

Dans ce sens, l’Union Soviétique, qui était certainement un état totalitaire, n’a pas atteint le fascisme. Mais, l’absence dans la société russe de la culture politique, de l’éducation politique et d’un débat politique ouvert et d’une vision politique, a permis à Poutine et son équipe de reprogrammer facilement la série des valeurs de l’ancien peuple soviétique, en manipulant les éléments de l’Etat socialiste, de créer une société pour une douzaine de milliardaires proches qui s’appelle l’entreprise « Russie ».

Tristement célèbre, le publiciste Charles Morasse a déclaré que « un socialisme libéré d’un élément démocratique et cosmopolite convient au nationalisme aussi bien qu’un gant bien cousu convient à une belle main »

Vladimir Poutine, dans la tête duquel, le modèle de l’Etat Soviétique s’est bien installé, s’est efficacement débarrassé du rudiment de la démocratie des années 90.

Et maintenant, tous ceux appellent à l’ouverture et l’intégration avec le monde civilisé ont été déclarés « les traites nationaux »

Et ce gant bien cousu s’adapte parfaitement à l’affreuse main du chauvinisme national russe.

Nous devons nous rappeler pour toujours, que ni un politicien, ni un Homme d’Etat ne sont autorisé au nom de l’intérêt de l’Etat de supprimer les valeurs constitutionnelles de base, dont il y a la garantie de la liberté, l’égalité de justice sociale, protection de la propriété privée et surtout les intérêts de l’individu.

La vie d’un Homme doit être la priorité parce que la communauté des gens ordinaires est l’Etat lui-même.

Sinon, chaque pays risque de devenir condamné en obtenant son Poutine.

Covadonga Romero | May 24, 2022

Three months have now passed since the Russian ‘special operation in’ or ‘invasion of’ (depends which sources you are citing) of Ukraine began. As the international community strives to understand this ‘denazification and demilitarization’ event, its causes and consequences, much has been said about war’s potential to fundamentally change the world order—and about the way it illustrates already ongoing shifts. Yet, every aspect of the global balance of power, security architecture, and geopolitical dynamics is challenged by the conflict.

On May 20, the Habibie Center addressed this topical issue through its Public Lecture Series. In an event titled ‘The Ukraine Crisis and its Implications for the Global Political Chessboard’, the Jakarta-based think tank hosted Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic (Vienna, Geneva, universities of ) for a discussion on the war’s repercussions, both globally, as well as for the Asian continent and its Southeastern theatre.

Prof. Bajrektarevic framed his thorough analysis of the conflict by alluding to the usual pattern of “critical insight formation” around an international crisis. The ‘problem’ and its ‘solution’ are presented as two halves to a whole picture; the latter depends on the lens through which the former is viewed. Within this picture, the lights and shadows consist of the ‘costs’ associated with the problem, and their ‘cost distribution’. The multi-dimensional nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine can be understood through this framework. Depending on where the problem’s centre of gravity is located—the rise of new threats in a multipolar order, the global energy crisis, the deterioration of European security structures—different costs can be identified for various stakeholders.

Clearing points at the entrée, professor stated: “the way we formulate the problem will inevitably determine our answer/s and lead the course of our action”. Hence, “today I will concentrate only on setting the questions we must ask to answer what this crisis is about”, explained professor before getting into a 40-minute questions elaboration.

The first key point that was touched upon was the set of historical drivers that shape Russia’s foreign policy today, and along with it, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Among these are the competing universalisms of East and West, insofar as these can be viewed as “not Venus and Mars, but rather two Martian worlds.” The beginning of this is marked by the great schism of the 11th century, with the split between the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches in 1054; from this arises the opportunistic use of religion and its different interpretations for ideological purposes, and the struggle between the dominant centre of religious interpretation and its peripheries or challengers. The events of the Age of Discovery—which saw the projection of European civilisation through political, military, and demographic expansion—reflect this, as exclusivity or dominance over religious interpretation was instrumentalised to justify imperialism.

Another historical factor is Russia’s prolonged perception of Europe as an existential threat. Although this is epitomised by the German-led Operation Barbarossa of 1941—which targeted Ukraine as an important economic territory—previous episodes, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War of 1853-1856, European interventionism during the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917-1923, or the humiliation of the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921, have also had a lasting impression on Russia’s historical memory. On this point, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes note of the symbolic parallels between the Napoleonic and Axis coalitions that have threatened Russia; these are strikingly similar in size and shape, both between themselves and to the European Union, a third ‘coalition’ that governs today’s continental Europe. Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the fragmentation of Eastern Europe is mentioned, as yet another driver of Russia’s contemporary threat perception.

Against this backdrop, Prof. Bajrektarevic gives an overview of the various aspects—politico-military, legal, economic, and ideological—of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war that are worth considering, in terms of the conflict’s global impact. In the politico-military realm, four key ideas stand out. One is the astonishing deficit of the so-called ‘collective’ West in its response, which is limited by the lack of communications with Russia, and therefore a lack of critical insight about Russian intentions and capabilities. This has led to a shortage of sober analysis on the matter, which manifests as a “dangerous security experiment,” whereby the antagonisation of Russia, supported by “state adventurism,” contributes to conflict escalation. Linked to this is an essential question: who are the conflict’s protagonists? Is this a war between Russia and Ukraine, or between the Russian Federation and NATO on Ukrainian soil?

The peculiar nature of military actions in Ukraine adds to the complexity that the country already experiences. A key aspect of this is its political history, from Kiev Russia, to a prosperous period under the Russian Empire, to a Soviet Republic. Furthermore, the way in which current military activity varies across different segments of Ukrainian territory is associated with the country’s demographic makeup. Before February 2022, Ukraine’s ethnic, linguistic, and religious composite was already reflective of various internal struggles, which have only been exacerbated by the conflict. In recent years, these have included an alarming Gini index and HDI score, as a result of depopulation, deindustrialisation, and the dismal state of civil rights in the post-Maidan Ukraine; now, the surge in internally-displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees will precipitate an irreversible change in Ukraine’s ethnic composition and socioeconomic development. Lastly, the landslide victory of President Zelensky, winning over 70% of the electoral vote in 2019, reflects the buildup of a certain political zeitgeist within Ukrainian society since 2014; among Zelensky’s main electoral promises was the peaceful reintegration of the contested Donbas region under the existing machinery of the Minsk talks.

Regarding these politico-military aspects of the Ukraine crisis, Prof. Bajrektarevic points out  the role of the media as an “accelerator of destruction.” Making reference to Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent, Bajrektarevic underlines the use of fear as a currency of control, and the widespread personalisation of the conflict through a sensationalist “Putin-versus-Zelensky” vision. This comes as a result of broader trends, such as the “long history of censorship in liberal democracies,” and the more recent phenomenon of complete desensitisation to misery by the numbers, epitomised by press coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic. The consequences of the media’s approach to Ukraine as an international crisis are far-reaching, with powerful and shockingly-different narratives being built around the conflict. An example is the issue of foreign aid for Ukraine, where a combination of widespread coverage and lack of transparency has led to a number of questions on the donors and receivers; on the quality and configuration of aid, particularly military aid; and on the potential threat of diverted stockpiles ending up in the black market.

On another note, there are several legal aspects to consider in order to understand the conflict’s evolution and implications. To begin with, the indivisibility of collective security from the very spirit of the UN Charter is presented as a potential issue. In this sense, the negotiations held in Geneva, between the US and Russia reflected the need and acceptance of a détente policy, which soon after officialized in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, and consequently institutionalized by the OSCE’s formation (Budapest) – were listed by professor along with other key elements of the post-WWII security architecture. In regard to previous disarmament and security non-expansion guarantees that are challenged by this conflict, it is worth noting the Reagan-Gorbachev talks in the late 1980s; the vision of a “common European home, from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” now seems but a “lame dream.” The same is true for NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) of 1994, which now stands in contrast to the Alliance’s paradoxical role, having been created for defensive purposes but with thirty years of accumulated offensive history across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. NATO’s interventions, although manifesting in different formats, have all underscored a “continued dismissal of Russian security concerns.”

Furthermore, the issue of “neutrality,” or lack thereof, is a key element of this crisis. To begin with, there is the question of Ukrainian neutrality, pledged in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and abandoned in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Much like Ukrainian neutrality was among Russia’s demands in negotiations over the Minsk agreements (particularly Minsk II), it is now a key condition for peace in the current context. On the other hand, recent developments such as Sweden and Finland’s NATO applications demonstrate how neutrality is more of a fluid concept than a legal guarantee. The implications of this period of change for the non-proliferation regime are disturbing, since unpredictability is a strong force of counterbalance against the multiple international treaties on nuclear and biological weapons. Ukraine’s abandonment of neutrality has led to capacity building, training, and an increase in bio-lab activities; Zelensky’s presidential statement at the Munich Security Conference in February 2022 further emphasizes this intention. All in all, it can be said that the notion of collective security, which previously seemed to rest upon a legal system of “confidence-building measures for active peaceful coexistence,” is seeing unprecedented erosion, into a selective one.

The global economic consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian war are presented from the perspective of costs induced and costs paid. Bajrektarevic’s argument highlights “peripheral countries” as those who bear the burden, particularly regarding the sectors that are at stake in this conflict; these include crude oil, natural gas, and wheat, which respectively come first, third and fifth among the world’s most traded commodities. On the other hand, a sector that is seeing growth as a result of this crisis is the global military-industrial complex. The war has accelerated the dismantling of obsolete military weaponry on Ukrainian soil, which is now being replaced with Western military purchases, financed through loans, donations, and lend-and-lease arrangements; in January 2022, a month before Russia’s intervention even began, the United States had already negotiated lend-lease contracts with Ukraine, totaling $30 billion. However, it is to note that gains for the military-industrial complex inevitably come with losses for international security and overall stability.

Another economic aspect, which has received much of the spotlight throughout the past three months, is the West’s sanctions on Russia and its legality. At present, the sixth round of sanctions has been negotiated. The continuity of this process and the short intervals between rounds make it a credible assumption that, for at least the first four rounds, the timeline was planned and expected. Moreover, the strategy within these rounds, including an arbitrary confiscation of overseas deposits and properties, has clearly been geared towards having an impact on the reputation and credibility of sanctions’ originators. On the other hand, a notion that illustrates the global spillover effects of the war in Ukraine is that of secondary sanctions, aimed at those who associate with the Russian Federation or refuse to punish it. The way in which ‘friendly’ and ‘unfriendly’ labels have been put on countries—even traditionally neutral actors—depending on their responses to this conflict is reflective of an overall realignment of the world order; or, at the very least, of the fight for control over the way in which this order is interpreted, and will further evolve.

On the flipside of sanctions, other economic consequences can be found. One is the apparent shift towards de-dollarisation, and even a fragmentation of the global monetary system, so far defined by the ¥€$ (Yen-Euro-US Dollar) domination. The paradoxical resilience of the Russian economy, whose indicators are looking up in spite of sanctions, is a factor behind this; it is also exacerbated by the rise of the “petro-ruble,” along with Europe’s incoherence and panic around energy insecurity. The question of energy has led many countries linked to the Russian Federation’s resources to walk one of two paths: either decoupling and decarbonising, in line with the post-Paris Treaty environmental agenda, or leaning into “preferential prices for friendly countries.” It is largely for this reason -a long with the OPEC solidarity over quotas – that the Russian energy sector remains competitive on the global market, highlighting the important economic role played by third-party countries in this crisis; India stands out as a particular question mark. Beyond this, the overall disruption of global supply chains as a result of war in Ukraine is equally as catastrophic in other sectors; the shortage of wheat exports, in which Ukraine is the main provider for at least 26 countries, has heavily disrupted the global food supply. History shows that a food crisis is not only catastrophic in terms of human security and development, but also as a driver of social unrest and conflict.

The last key theme touched upon by Prof. Bajrektarevic is the conflict’s ideological dimension. The unprecedented nature of a full-scale, traditional war in the European continent as of 2022, and its disruption of the Pax Europaea period that began in 1945, has given rise to a number of reflections and questions. Is it liberal to impose liberal values on illiberal societies? Is the Westernisation of Eastern Europe possible without perpetuating anti-Russian rhetoric? Under this umbrella, several norms, values and key tenets of the Western-led neoliberal institutionalist system—collective security, responsibility to protect (R2P), regime change—are challenged. In trying to make sense of this new reality, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes reference to the “three brave ideas of the 20^th century” and their interpretation of territorial competition. First came the egalitarian, non-territorial dogma of the Bolshevik revolution; then, the radicalisation of the material and revival of imperialism through various Fascisms, as well as Nazism; lastly, the ultimate triumph of the non-material and non-territorial idea, through glasnost and Perestroika, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union marking a significant departure from the traditional international conduct.

With the transition into the 21^st century, the emergence of “transhumanism” as an alternative (post) capitalistic ideological model where “humans [are seen ] without spiritual dimension, reduced on bio-hackable animal/Bionicle connected to a global IoT network for control and commercial end” gains on ground. This, along with the diminished credibility of Clash of Civilization reasoning, opens a whole new set of questions. The implications of this war for new conflicts within ethno-religious lines span not only the post-1990s “intra-Slavic Guernica”; they also include the wider Islamic world, whereby a break between the Muslim ‘core’ (the MENA region) and the ‘peripheral’ non-Arab Muslim communities in Europe’s south, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Overall, the question mark next to the promise of democracy suggests that the Russo-Ukrainian war may be the prelude to an inevitable recession, to the return of great power competition. This reflects how the ideological crisis triggered by the conflict is also one of global proportions.

Having laid out all the relevant aspects explored in this lecture, some key takeaways remain. Regarding the potential future outcomes, Prof. Bajrektarevic illustrates the struggle between the ideas of “global realignment” and “decoupling.” Alluding to historical precedent, such as the contrast between the statesmanship of Metternich’s Concert of Europe and the short-sightedness of the Versailles Conference, he argues for the existence of various possibilities—ranging from the total destruction of Ukraine and nuclear war, to sincere peace talks. Finally, following “global repercussions” as the thread that runs throughout his argument, Bajrektarevic’s closing remarks are relevant to Asia-Pacific, and particularly to the Republic of Indonesia, where the Habibie Center is based. Likely outcomes of the conflict’s ripple effect are an overall momentum of destabilization reaching the region at large, thus leading to a reform of the triangular RIC (Russia-India-China) model in continental Asia, and a recession of multilateralism (including ASEAN) in Southeast Asia. Considering the role of Indonesia within this compact, and recalling the previous reflections on loss of neutrality, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes a key recommendation—where Indonesia, ASEAN and Asia must take a side, the side to pick is that of international law, and accelerated multilateralism including the spirt of Non-Aliened movement.

Covadonga Romero

International Relations specialist (Madrid-based IE University, Spain) with a concentration on Peace, Conflict and Security. Foreign policy analyst and writer at RAIA Group.

(Return of the Wir wussten nicht)

Anis H. Bajrektarevic

He who does not wish to speak of capitalism should remain forever silent about Nazism” – I quoted West Germany’s Max Horkheimer some two years ago discussing the disastrous, cynical and absolutely unnecessary attempts towards the equation of communism with Nazism, of fascism and anti-fascism. Many dismissed it, labelling it routinely as yet another intellectual alarmism, but look at us now: Only one step from the nuclear obliteration.

Right than – in that text – I also borrowed from yet another Frankfurter, Herbert Marcuse on the self-entrapment of Western society. Back in 1960s, it was him labelling as “repressive tolerance” if someone in future ever considers a dangerous and ahistorical equitation between Nazism and anything else, least with Communism. Regrettably enough, that future of de-evolution started pouring in by 1990s: It was manifested in decontextualization coupled with psychologization which eventually culminated in the current Covid-19 iron fist and the binary categorisations over Ukraine. L’avenir est comme le reste: il n’est plus ce qu’il était (the future is no longer what it used to be), as Paul Valéry ironically remarked.

Umberto Eco – in his ur-fascism of 1995 – of course, didn’t see the entire world arrested on one pathogen, one narrative about it, one solution mandated for all (like the escalation as the only solution for Ukraine), along with suppression of any debate about it. Back then in mid-1990’s, Eco didn’t visualise it but he well sensed where it might but should never go: Trivialisation of our important contents will brutally hit us back – for instance funning the emotional charge in lieu of provable facts. Or the rapid deterioration of an elaborate, hundred years-old, commonly agreed humanitarian law into legalisation and institutionalisation of racism – firstly in migration affairs, and by now in refugee management matters, too.

(Immunisation of herd – as tirelessly agitated via media, inevitable ends up in herd loyalty: From pandemia to plundermia, from discussion to binarization. 1930s are powerful reminder: From Reichstags Fire to Kristallnacht and on, and on, and on.)

Here we are today; 77 years after the glorious Victory Day, fighting (again) invisible enemy within. Therefore, the antifascist fundaments of modern Europe and its best living edifices: – Nurnberg principles, the UN Charter and Helsinki spirit, are today relevant more than ever. This is not our (political) choice, it is the only way to survive. Surely, any equitation attempt is a beginning of infection. And the (decontextualising, aculturalizing, hence dehumanising) immuno-fascism, be it one of 1930’s or of 2020’s always starts with a silence. Silence, which is both an acceptance and accomplice. In vain is a self-comforting excuse of othering; Wir wussten nicht (it was others, not us).

To prevent it, revisiting the most relevant chapters of our near history is worth of doing. Or as the grand Wiz of the EU, Jean Monnet used to say: if you have an unsolvable dilemma – enlarge the context.

No llores porque ya se terminó, sonríe porque sucedió[3]

In fact, the 1930s were full of public admirations of and frequent official visits to an Austrian-born Hitler. It was not only reserved for the British royal family (e.g., Edward VIII), but for many more prominents from both sides of the Atlantic (e.g., Henry Ford). By 1938 in Munich, this ‘spirit of Locarno’ has been confirmed in practice when French President Daladier and British PM Chamberlain (Atlantic Europe) jointly paid a visit to Germany and gave concessions – practically a free hand – to Hitler and Mussolini (Central Europe) on gains in Eastern Europe (Istria, Czechoslovakia and beyond). Neither Atlantic Europe objected to the pre-Munich solidification of Central Europe: Hitler–Mussolini pact and absorption of Austria, following a massive domestic Austrian support to Nazism of its well-educated and well-informed 719,000 members of the Nazi party (nearly a third of a that-time total Austrian electorate), as well as a huge ring of sympathizers. In a referendum organised by the Austro-Nazis a month after the Anschluss, 99.7% of Austrians voted ‘Yes’ to annexation.[4] 

By brokering the Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression deal between Berlin and Moscow, but only a year after the Munich-shame – in 1939 (incl. the stipulations on Finland, Baltic states, as well as Poland that already participated in the partition of Czechoslovakia), Stalin desperately tried to preempt the imminent. That was a horror of an uncontrolled expansion of Central onto Eastern Europe and closer to Russia – something already largely blessed and encouraged by Atlantic Europe. 

However, it should be kept in mind that for the very objective of lebensraum policy (character and size of space needed for Germanophones to unhindered, live and prosper), the Jews, Roma and behavioristic minorities were the non-territorial obstacle. However, Slavs and their respective Slavic states in Eastern Europe were the prime territorial target of Hitler-led Central Europe’s ‘final solution’. Therefore, no wonder why so much fifth column crop among Slavs. For the speeding and smoothening of the lebensraum objective, Quisling was needed as PM in Norway, but Slavic quisling-elites were cattled in each and every of that time major Slavic states – useful idiots in Poland, in Ukraine, in Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria, etc. 

This chapter would be definitely one of the possible spots for a thorough examination, if we only wish to diligently elaborate why Atlantic and Scandinavian Europe scored so much of Nazi-collaboration while Eastern and Russophone Europe opposed and fiercely resisted.[5]

For some 300 years, Russia and the Ottomans – like no other European belligerents – have fought series of bitter wars over the control of the Black Sea plateau and Caucasus – sectors, which both sides (especially the Ottomans) have considered as geopolitically pivotal for their posture. Still, neither party has ever progressed at the battlefield as to seriously jeopardize the existence of the other. However, Russia has experienced such moves several times from within Europe. Three of them were critical for the very survival of Russia, and the fourth was rather instructive: the Napoleonic wars, Hitler’s Drang nach Osten, the so-called ‘contra-revolutionary’ intervention,[6] and finally the brief but deeply humiliating war with Poland (1919-21).

In absence of acceptance, quest for the strategic depth

Small wonder, that in 1945, when Russians– suffering over 20 million of mostly civilian casualties (practically, an extermination of the entire population in many parts of the western Soviet Union), and by far the heaviest continental burden of the war against Nazism – arrived on wings of their tanks and ideology to Central Europe, they decided to stay.[7] Extending their strategic depth westwards–southwestwards, and fortifying their presence in the heart of Europe,[8] was morally an occupation. Still, it was geopolitically the single option left, which Stalin as a ruthless person but an excellent geo-strategist perfectly understood. 

 Cold-War Europe- after WWII
Just a quick look at the geographic map of Europe would show that the low-laying areas of western Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe are practically non-fortifiable and indefensible. Their topography exposes the metropolitan area and city of Moscow to an extreme vulnerability. So, the geostrategic dictatum is that in absence of any deep canyon, serious ridge or mountain chain, the only protection is either a huge standing army (expensive and badly needed in other corners of this vast country) and/or an extension of the strategic depth. 

Indeed, if we truly want to elaborate on why Atlantic and Scandinavian Europe bred so much obedience and Nazi-collaboration (with Central Europe) and largely passively stood by, while Eastern and Russophone Europe (solely) fiercely resisted and fought, we should advisably examine the financial, moral, demographic and politico-military cost-benefit ratio of the WWII, too. The subsequent, sudden and lasting Cold War era has prevented any comprehensive scientific consensus. The unbiased, de-ideologized and objective view on the WWII was systematically discouraged. Soviets consistently equated Nazism and imperialism while the US, for its part, equated fascism and communism. Until this very day, we do not have a full accord on causes and consequences of events in years before, during and after the WWII.[9] Therefore the paradox – the holocaust denial is a criminal offense, but all other important things surrounding Nazism and its principal European victims; Slavs and their states, are tentative and negotiable, elastic and eligible for a periodic political re-engineering. 

EuropeToday
The same applies to the comparative analysis of the economic performance of East and West.[10] E.g., was the much-celebrated Truman’s Marshall aid to the post-WWII western Europe, originally meant to be the US reimbursement to the Soviets for the enormous burden they took throughout the WWII – the financial assistance that was repeatedly promised by Roosevelt to Stalin, but never delivered past his death in spring 1945? Saturated by the Nazi Germany beyond comprehension, the Soviet Union was rebuilding alone itself and Eastern Europe, while the moderately damaged Western Europe got – including Germany – a massive, ideologically conditioned, financial help. 

In a nutshell; if we disaggregate Europe into its compounding historical components, it is safe to say the following: The very epilogue of both WWs in Europe was a defeat of the Central (status quo challenger) against Atlantic Europe (status quo defender). All this with the relatively absent, neutral Scandinavian Europe, of Eastern Europe being more an object than a subject of these mega-confrontations, and finally with a variable success of Russophone Europe. 

Finally, back to Franco-German post-WWII re-rapprochement. 

Obviously, that was far more than just a story about the two countries signing d’accord. It truly marked a final decisive reconciliation of two Europes, the Atlantic and Central one. The status quo Europe has won on the continent but has soon lost its overseas colonies. Once realizing it, the road for ‘unification’ of the equally weakened protagonists in a close proximity was wide open. This is the full meaning of the 1961 Elysée. 

Why does the de-trivialization, de-psychologization, re-historization and re-contextualization matters today? Because, our further simplification breads binarization, and that is a road for escalation beyond the point of return. What is at stake are not anymore (only) principles, but our very survival. 

(End of the last, 3rd Part)

About author:
Anis H. Bajrektarevic is chairperson and professor in international law and global political studies, Vienna, Austria. He has authored eight books (for American and European publishers) and numerous articles on, mainly, geopolitics energy and technology. Professor is editor of the NY-based GHIR (Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations) journal, and editorial board member of several similar specialized magazines on three continents. His 9th book “The European Union: Genesis, Institutions, Instrument”s is just released in March 2022.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.

Ambasador prof. Dumitru CHICAN

În paralel cu suferinţele, dramele umane şi uriaşele distrugeri materiale pricinuite de invazia militară a armatelor ruse în Ukraina,  impactul reţelei de sancţiuni internaţionale impuse invadatorilor, războiul ucrainean, ajuns la vârsta de două luni, se manifestă, deja, cu perspective deloc optimiste, la nivelul întregului eşafodaj al economiei globale, devenind, de facto, un flagel fără frontiere.

Primele simptome ale acestor repercusiuni se manifestă pe câteva coordonate cu perspective de continuitate şi anume:

– Creşterea abruptă a preţurilor la o serie de produse de primă necesitate între  care, pe un loc de frunte, se situează produsele alimentare şi  sursele primare de energie, categorii de mărfuri cu un înalt indice al inflaţiei în domenii adiacente;

– Este vorba, în al doilea rând, de apariţia unor puternice perturbaţii în segmentul schimburilor comerciale şi, implicit, în reţeaua complexă a lanţurilor şi sistemelor de aprovizionare, la a căror dezechilibrare o contribuţie însemnată o are erupţia valurilor de refugiaţi, deplasaţi şi transfugi.

– Situaţia apărută pe fondul conflictului ucrainean va avea influenţe negative şi în sectorul financiar-bancar, afectat de diminuarea şi tulburarea raporturilor de încredere şi cooperare între instituţiile financiare,, pe de o parte, şi beneficiariii individuali sau instituţionali ai  tranzacţiilor financiare, pe de altă parte.

Este evident că impactul actualului conflict nu va avea o structură şi o intensitate uniformă, acestea luând forme distincte în funcţie de specificităţile regionale şi naţionale afectate de conflictul ruso-ucrainean:  Şi ne referim, cu deosebire, la următoarele coordonate ale geografiei politice globale:

Europa

Potrivit  estimărilor recente al Fondului Monetar Internaţional,  Ambientul continental european  al războiului  are perspectiva de a fi una dintre cele zonele cele   mai expuse consecinţelor conflictului armat aflat în desfăşurare., având în vedere, între altele, că sacnţiunile economice fără precedent  impuse  Rusiei s-au materializat, cu deosebire, în încetarea fluxului de gaze naturale către consumatorii europeni, după ce, prin tradiţie, Rusia a fost principala sursă de hidrocarburi a spaţiului european. Comunitatea europeană este, desigur, într-o  susţinută căutare de furnizori energetici substituenţi, dar aceasta nu va putea să evite efectele unei creşteri consistente a ratei inflaţiei şi a preţurilor de consum la nivelul consumatorilor casnici şi al industriilor mari consumatoare de energie.. Se apreciază că o asemenea criză a energiei va  fi resimţită cu o intensitate crescută în spaţiul Europei de Est şu Centrală, ca urmare a influxului masiv de refugiaţi generat de războiul ucrainean. Un raport al ONU estimează că această parte a continentului a primit, deja, cea mai mare parte a celor peste 3 milioane de refugiaţi de război ucrainieni.

Orientul Mijlociu şi Nordul maghrebian al Africii

Pentru Orientul Mijlociu şi Africa de Nord (M.E.N.A)  provocarea cea mai îngrijorătoare vine dinspre sectorul alimentar şi, pentru o parte a comunităţii arabe, dinspre înăsprirea climatului financiar şi bugetar deja ameninţat de vulnerabilităţi. Indicatorii modeşti ai ritmului de dezvoltare însoţit de o expansiune a crizei alimentare – deja manifestă – incumbă riscul lunecării către tulburări sociale, protestatare şi revendicative  care,  cumulate, pot să ia amploarea unei noi “primăveri arabe” cu conseciţe uşor de imaginat.

Africa Subsahariană

Serios afectate de pandemia virală globală, de o serie de conflicte şi tulburări sociale, statele din continentul Africii Negre,  sunt prea puţin imune la presiunea consecinţelor generate, la nivel mondial, de conflictul ucrainean. Aceleaşi estimări ale ONU şi ale Fondului Monetar Internaţional, califică ansamblul acestui continent ca fiind “deosebit de vulnerabil”,  în faţa crizelor fianciare, a penuriei alimentare şi energetice, a căror povară este accentuată şi de diminuarea severă a veniturilor din turism şi de accesul limitat la piaţa bancar-financiară internaţională.

Deosebit de îngrijătoare este perspectiva declanşării unei crize alimentare, în condiţiile în care, pe de o parte, se şteaptă creşteri progresive sle preţurilor  la grâu şi, pe de altă parte, acest produs cerealier care este, asigurat, în cea mai mare măsură, din importuri  provenite,  în proporţie de cca. 85% din Federaţia Rusă. şi Ucraina.

America Latină şi Caraibe

Ca şi în regiunile amintite, explozia preţurilor la materii prime, cereale, alimente şi resurse de energie, deţine un loc  preponderent pe lista dificultăţilor prognozate pentru America de Sud şi Caraibe. În plus, crizriza ucraineană şi efectele sale extinse, determină o creştere abruptă a ratei inflaţiei care, deja, în unele state precum Brazilia, Mexic, Chile, Peru, a depăşit, deja, nivelul de 8%..

Şi Rusia?

Se poate spune  că conomia mondială se îndreaptă către o perioadă dificilă pe care unii analişti o compară cu ‘şocul petrolier” din 1973-1974,  când, pe fondul războiului arabo-israelian din octombrie, ţările producătoare de petrol, în frunte cu Arabia Saudită au blocat exporturile de hidrocarburi, provocând o criză fără precedent în istoria modernă.

În acest context, prin  invadarea Ucrainei şi prin  sancţiunile punitive instituite de cvasitotalitatea statelor lumii, guvernanţa lui Vladimir Putin îşi asumă riscul de a afecta grav  o econoie naţională în bună parte conectată la modernitate şi deschisă relaţionării cu lumea exterioară.

Exclusă din dinamica sistemului financiar internaţional şi supusă unui embargou asupra schimburilor comerciale, Rusia se află în faţa incipientă a unei spirale  inflaţioniste  în care  rubla rusească a cunoscut, de la criza  Crimeei până în prezent , o devalorizare de 72%.

Viitorul poate fi asemuit unui Janus cu două chipuri, oscilând între o decizie internaţională de permanentizare a sancţiunilor economice şi o încetare rapidă a  campaniei dîn Ukraina care ar putea pune în discuţie o  reaşezare a  regimului de penalităţi.

Dar chiar după o virtuală ridicare sau restrângere a sancţiunilor, economiile lumii, inclusiv economia rusească vor rămâne mai multă vreme în sala de reanimare.

Ambasador prof. Dumitru CHICAN

1

De la declanşarea brutalei “operaţiuni militare speciale” ordonate de Vladimir Putin în Ucraina, Administraţia Joe Biden şi Alianţa Atlanticului de Nord – cei doi  principali furnizori de asistenţă militară materială şi umanitară pentru susţinerea rezistenţei de apărare a ucrainenilor şi a preşedintelui Volodimir Zelensky – Pentagonul şi NATO au fost în situaţia permanentă de a întreprinde o bine gândită echilibristică între decizia şi dorinţa de a răspunde cât mai satisfăcător  necesitătilor de luptă ale formaţiunilor combatante ucrainene, pe de o parte şi a asigura continuitatea acestei asistenţe într-o manieră care să evitte o extensie şi o înteţire a conflictului până la o limită de la care evoluţiile pe front să scape de sub control.

 Se poate spune că în cele aproape două luni de război, iraţional, Pentagonul a inundat arealul ucrainean all frontului  cu o impresionantă cantitate de material militar, livrările fiind dominate de material combativ uşor, precum rachetele portabile anti-tanc din clasa Javelin, furnizorii refuzând constant să înscrie pe lista furniturilor armament greu, inclusiv avioane de luptă, determinaţi fiind de teama că o gamă mai largă de produse cu parametri tehnici avansaţi, ar putea să determine escaladări disproporţionate din partea Kremlinului

O asemenea oscilaţie nu a rămas fără reacţii, mai ales în ultimul timp,  când, în  Congres se fac tot mai auzite observaţii critice atât din partea republicanilor, cât şi a democraţilor. “Am sentimentul – spunea influentul senator democrat Richard Blumenthal- că  strategia noastră este oarecum schizofrenică, în măsura în care, pe de o parte, vrem ca Ucraina să  câştige în faţa Rusiei, iar pe de altă parte ne temem de ce va putea să facă  Putin”. Un alt senator,republican,  – Kevin Kramer- spunea  retoric : “S-a întrebat cineva dacă  Vladimir Putin  s-a gândit că masacrarea femeilor şi copiilor este sau nu un act de escaladare?

2

În mai toate apariţiile sale publice, în declaraţiile de poziţie sau în contactele şi întâlnirile sale cu mijloacele medatice, cu lideri de state, sau în alocuţiunile adresate forurilor forurilor parlamentare din state “prietene”, sau la reuniuni ale ONU şi la  lucrările conducerii europene de la Bruxelles, una dintre temele recurente şi patetic dezvoltate în discursul preşedintelui ucrainean a fost, cu predilecţie, nevoia acută a ţării sale de armamen. Patetismul investit de dl Zelensky a  căpătat, de cele mai multe ori, o dimensiune suprasolicitată pănă la o tonalitate  de avertisment şi atenţionare  ultimativă, În retorica sa, războiul eroic în  care  Ucraina a fost târâtă îpotriva voinţei sale,  poporul ucrainean luptă, se înţelege, pentru apărarea existenţei sale statale şi naţionale independente şi suverane, dar în acelaşi timp, lupta sa  trebuie privită şi ca un act de apărare a Europei şi a stabilităţii şi păcii universale. Altfel spus, o înfrângere pe front a Ucrainei ar echivala cu o îngenunchere şi un eşec ireparabil al păcii şi ordinii mondiale. Înţelegând patetismul narativului naţional al preşedintelui  Zelensky, trebuie să remarcăm, sine ira et studio, că, tocmai o satisfacere pripită a dorinţei ne-echivoce a lliderului ucranian de a determina o implicare nemijlocită şi colectivă a Statelor Unite şi a Alianţei Atlanticului de Nord în conflict ar fi deschis, indubitabil, drumul necunoscut  şi aventurist al lunecării lumii şi, desigur, a   Ucrainei într-un al treilea război planetar fără învinşi şi fără învingători.

 Lăsând de-o parte, cererea repetitivă şi aproape ultimativă a Kievului ca structurile euro-atlantice să impună o blocadă totală a spaţiului aerian ucrainean pentru aviaţa rusă  ar  fi însemnat riscul unei confruntări  directe cu aparatele inamice nju trebuie ignorat că opţiunile disponibile Occidentului sunt, în mod obiectiv, limitate.Iar una din asemenea limitări ţine de însăşi tehnologia şi logistica tenicii sofisticate occidentale, a cărei utilizare presupune o perioadă de cel puţin câteva săptămâni pentru instruirea personalului, ceea ce ar însemna, ca, în ritmul  alert de evoluţie a frontului ucrainean, ca  tehnica respectivă să-şi piardă din eficienţă.

Tanctul american Abrams  are un turbomotor  mare consumator de carburanţi, iar sistemele de ghidare prin laser şi prin sisteme cibernetice are nevoie de echipaje bine familiarizate pentru a obţine eficienţa dorită. Ceea ce nu poate fi realizat “din mers” şi în câteva zile. Probleme similare sunt proprii şi aviaţiei.

Răspunzând observaţiilor critice formulate de aleşii repubblicani şi democraţi din Congres, Casa Albă a  dat publicităţii un inventar exhaustiv al furniturilor livrate Ucrainei pănă în momentul de faţă:

– 5.000 rachete şi lansatoare de rachete anti-tanc  “Javelin”;

– 1.400 sisteme de rachete antiaeriene “Stinger”

– 7.000  alte  arme anti-tanc

– Câteva sute de drone sinucigaşe din clasa “Swichblade”

Mai multe drone din clasa “Puma”

– 50 milioane unităţi muniţii de diverse calibre

– 7.000 puşti de asalt

– 45.000 veste anti-glonţ

– Staţii radar  anti-blindate şi anti-drone

– Blindate uşoare

 Tehică de protecţie anti-mine

 – Sisteme de comunicaţii securizate

În prezent, Ucraina are un consistent stoc de armament de ultimă generaţie, provenit din lfurnituri occidentale, precum:

– Sistemul portabil de rachete sol – aer  “Startreak MADPS, cea mai rapidă armă din această categorie cu rază scurtă de acţiune, concepută, fabricată şi licrată de Marea Britanie.

– Două rude americane – rachetele Javelin  şi Şi Stingher, deja amintite şi care deja şi-au dovedit eficiacitate pe front. Surse militare ruseşti apreciază că stocul de rachete Javelin” de care dispun ukrainenii este superior, numeric, rezervei unui stat membru al NATO.

– Drona americană Switchblade, sau “drona kamikatze”, portabilă, cu explozie la impact.

– Drona turcească “Bayraktar TB2 cu bombe ghidate prin aser.

Pentru Volodimir Zelinsky aceste licrări sunt necesare pentru “supravieţuire”, dar solicită, în plus, livrări suplimentare şi tancuri şi avioane , tot pentru “supravieţuire”, un punct de vedere cu  care, deocamdată cel puţin, furnizorii nu sunt de acord.

 Potrivit purtătorului de cuvând al Pentagonului, John Kirby, până acum, preşedintele Joe Biden a aprobat deblocarea unui fond de 2,4 miliarde dolari pentru asistenţă militară acordată Kievului, echivalând, aproximativ cu întregul buget militar al Ucrainei.

S-a spus, pe bună dreptate, că pentru prima dată, un eveniment major politico-militar pe continentul european, respectiv războiul ucrainean a determinat atât o dinamizare a Alianţei Nord-Atlantice (despre care s-a făcut afirmaţia că “se află în moarte cerebrală”)cât şi  o rapidă şi funcţională solidaritate de gândire şi acţiune cu comunitatea europeană Iar  \aceasta s-a manifestat nu numai în segmenul abordărilor ideologice, doctrinare şi de planificare, ci şi în coeziunea pe care întregul areal euro-atlantic a afirmat-o faţă cu intervenţia rmilitară rusă în Ucraina, dar şi cu susţinerea militară, economică, financiară, umanitară şi în alte domenii ale ripostei ucrainiene la  invazia la care această ţară este supusă. Individual sau în cadru organizaţioal, numeroase state –  membre sau nu ale Uniunii Europene şi NATO –  s-au alăturat efortului internaţional de asistenţă acordată   Ucrainei,  şi instituţiilor sale de apărare. De la furnizarea de material militar combatant şi logistic, la echipamente, carburanţi, medicamente şi produse alimentare, ajutorare şi îngrijirre pentru refugiaţii ucraineni alungaţii de la căminele lor şi până la asigurarea de  servicii medicale, spitaliceşti, educaţionale, umanitare o mare verietate de ajutoare au fost dirijate în flux continuu încă din primele zile ale intervenţiei ruse.

3

Observaţii în loc de încheiere

Observaţia 1:  Într-o recentă declaraţie pentru Agenţia Română de Presă Agerpres, secretarul general adjunct al NATO, Mircea Geoană, afirma, între altele, că “armata ucraineană  este o armată de tip NATO, pentru că i-am antrenat timp de ani şi zile””

Observaţia 2: În raportul său pe anul trecut, Agenţia  americană “Global Firepower Index” plasează Ucraina pe locul 22 în lista ţărilor cele mai bine dotate din punct de vedere al dotării şi capacităţilor militare. Dacă, în anul 2014, când Rusia a anexat Peninsula Crimea, ministrul ucrainean al Apărării declara  că armata ţării sale dispunea de un potenţial uman cifrat la numai 6.000 de oameni,, “şocul Crimea” a venit ca un duş îngheţat. Astfel, potrivit sursei sus-menţionate, în 2021 armata ucraineană dispunea de între 145-150 mii de  oameni, cifră ajustată ulterior la 200.000 personal cu pregătire de luptă.

Observaţia 3: În perioada dintre ieşirea din componenţa fostei URSS şi momentul 2014, Ucraina şi-a dezvoltat o puternică industrie militară, asigurându-şi un loc proeminent pe piaţa internaţională de armament, cu  un aport valoric de 7,6% din Produsul Intern Brut (cf. Institutul SIPRI din Stockholm). În acelaşi timp, şeful Agenţiei de Exporturi Militare UkroBoronProm, declara  că până în 2025 se are În vedere creşterea de 5 ori a exporturilor de profil, ajungându-se la un volum nominal anual de 2 miliarde dolari. Este de crezut că, paralel cu livrările externe, guvernul de la Kiev a avut grijă să constituie suficiente stocuri proprii de armamente, echipamente şi logistică militară necesară pentru a acoperi necesităţile de apărare a ţării, logic fiind  ca  ieşirea din fosta Uniune Sovietică să găsească o armată ucraineană cu depozitele suficient de pline cu tehnologii şi infrastructură de apărare

Dar, totuşi, cu o  armată având  un bun potenţial militar cu pregătire combativă “de tip NATO”, cu  rezerve virtuale de producţie autohtonă sau rusească sovietică, Volodimir  Zelensky  nu osteneşte să solicite ajutoare externe în arme şi tehnică de luptă. Cum poate fi înţeleasă aceasta?

La o analiză de bun-simţ, răspunsul nu este greu de identificat.

Confruntată cu un adversar de mai multe ori superior, armata ucraineană a manifestat un admirabil şi onorabil patriotism şi spirit de sacrificiu. Dar  este de înţeles că oricât de înflăcărat ar fi spiritul naţional al soldatului de pe front, acesta poate fi subminat sau chiar anihilat atunci când nu este susţinut cu instrumentele necesare. Or, sortimental şi calitativ, dotarea de luptă a forţelor de rezistenţă este depăşit, realizat pe vremea Uniunii Sovierice şi după parametri care astăzi au devenit caduci, şi insuficient de efi competitivii în faţa unei armate invadatoare înzestrate cu armamente de ultimă generaţie, unele fiind supuse primelor teste chiar pe frontul ucrainean. Volodimir  Zelensky nu dispune nici de bombe termobarice, nici de rachete hipersonice şi nici de sistemele informatice şi cibernetice pe care le aruncă în luptă generalii lui Vladimir Putin. Spre a nu mai aminti  că aviaţia militară e ucrainienilor este, din păcate, “Cenuşăreasa” instituţiei militare. Dar cât de dispusă şi de neîncorsetată de limite este comunitatea înternaţională pentru a oferi armele sofisticate şi  eficiente pe care  Zelinsky le cere şi le cere cu un apetit suprasolicitat?

Se pare că, faţă cu lejeritatea şi dezinteresul lui Putin pentru negocierile de pace şi în perspectiva unei amplificări teritoriale a ofensivei ruseşti, Occidentul va manifesta un plus de flexibilitate. La 11 aprilie, la reuniunea miniştrilor europeni  de Externe , Înaltul comisar al UE pentru Afaceri Ex terne, Josep Borrell a cerut statelor membre să trimită arrme Ucrainei “nu în săptămâni, ci în zile”. Si europenii s-au angajat să examineze cu celeritate acest apel, urmând ca,de  data a ceasta, livrările să includă şi tancuri, lansatoare multiple de rachete şi altă tehnică avansată

“Securitatea ucrainenilor  poate fi apărată cu armata pentru care, noi,  ca Unune Europeană şi ca prieteni, vom spori transporturile de arme”, declara ministrul german  de  Externe, Annalina Baerbock.

Poate  că armele Europei vor aduce mai curând, liniştea şi vor reînvia o urare rusească  datând din ultimul Război Mondial : “Miru Mir !”, Pace lumii!